Cognitive Neuroscience: Distinguishing Self from Other  by Burnett, Stephanie & Husain, Masud
Dispatch
R189barbules de quelques Paradisaeide’s
sur coupes en microscopie e’lectronique.
Relations avec les phe‘nome’nes
d’interfe’rences. C.R. Acad. Sci. Paris. 278,
285–290.
16. Mathger, L.M., Land, M.F., Siebeck, U.E., and
Marshall, N.J. (2003). Rapid colour change in
multilayer reflecting stripes in the paradisewhiptail, Pentapodus paradiseus. J. Exp. Biol.
206, 3607–3613.
17. Vukusic, P., Sambles, J.R., Lawrence, C.R., and
Wootton, R.J. (2001). Structural colour: now
you see it – now you don’t. Nature 410, 36.
18. Doucet, S.M., and Meadows, M.G. (2009).
Iridescence: a functional perspective. J. R. Soc.
Interface 6, S115–S132.School of Physics, University of Exeter,
Stocker Road, Exeter EX4 4QL, UK.
E-mail: P.Vukusic@ex.ac.ukDOI: 10.1016/j.cub.2011.01.049Cognitive Neuroscience:
Distinguishing Self from OtherNeurons in medial frontal cortex have been found to distinguish between
whether an animal or its partner is responding on a turn-taking task, but are
they really the basis of a social learning mechanism?Stephanie Burnett and Masud Husain
Isn’t it irritating when people cannot
wait their turn and interrupt? The ability
to ‘take turns’, whether during
a conversation or other cooperative
activity, is a fundamental requirement
for successful social interactions. At
just a fewmonths of age, human infants
show evidence of engaging in
interactions with their caregiver,
including taking their turn [1]. Social
development continues through
childhood and adolescence, with
emerging awareness of a social
concept of self as viewed by other
people [2]. Such abilities are
considered to be evidence for neural
mechanisms that distinguish between
‘self’ and ‘other’.
By contrast, an ever-expanding
literature on ‘mirror neurons’ —
neurons that respond similarly to
actions of self and other — has shifted
attention to brain mechanisms that do
not distinguish between whether we
perform an act, or someone else does.
Much has been written about the
possible functions of such mirror
neurons [3–5], but evidence for single
neurons involved in the converse
function of distinguishing self from
other has, until recently, been
conspicuously absent [6]. A primate
electrophysiology study [7] published
recently in Current Biology provides
novel evidence for a role of the medial
frontal cortex in differentiating self from
other’s action during a turn-taking task
in which it is imperative not to interrupt.
Yoshida et al. [7] trained two
macaques to perform a rewarded task.
On each trial, one animal was assigned
the role of actor, and the other was anobserver. Roles alternated every two
trials. During each trial, the actor made
a choice between a green or yellow
illuminated button, the position of
which could swap randomly; whereas
the observer simply held down a red
button for the duration of the trial. Both
animals received a juice reward if the
actor made the ‘correct’ choice, and
both animals could see the other’s
actions. The button colour that was
rewarded remained constant for
several trials, but reward contingencies
switched without warning every so
often. So now the animal whose turn it
was to act had to switch to choosing
the alternative coloured button. Thus,
reward expectation was constant
across animals on a given trial, and the
experimenters were able to identify
agent-specific neural signals.
Recordings were made from medial
frontal cortex during actor and
observer trials. In line with a recent
human electrophysiology study [8],
mirror neurons were observed that
fired similarly to a green or yellow
choice made by either animal. But, in
addition, the authors observed ‘partner
neurons’. These fired selectively to
a choice made by the partner and, in
the main, remained unmoved during
the choices of self. The authors
argue that partner neurons provide
a neural substrate for self–other
differentiation which enables social
learning in the task.
Recordings were made in two
adjacent sites, the pre-supplementary
motor area (pre-SMA) and the cingulate
sulcus, with partner neurons being
encountered more frequently in the
pre-SMA. Yoshida et al. [7] speculate
that these neurons might play a criticalrole in social learning. Indeed, studies
of Theory of Mind — the attribution to
others of mental states that account for
their behavior, for example, ‘my partner
believes the green button will be
rewarded’ — have implicated medial
frontal regions, together with the
temporoparietal junction, in this
function in humans [9–11]. The authors
suggest that connections between
multisensory superior temporal sulcus
(STS) and pre-SMA might form a brain
network involved in assigning agency.
Focal damage to the STS in humans
can lead to unusual syndromes, for
example loss of possession of one’s
own arm [12], perhaps consistent with
a role for agency. However, the medial
frontal areas that are considered to be
important for Theory of Mind in humans
are located far more anteriorly (rostral)
to the pre-SMA [9]. Furthermore, their
precise contribution is unclear as
bilateral lesions to them can leave
Theory of Mind intact [13].
Nevertheless, the proposed
function of partner neurons in
assigning agency to other versus self
would be a necessary first step in the
assignment of discrete mental states to
other — wherever that might be
computed in the brain. In this way they
might be considered precursors to
a social agency or social learning
system. But is self–other
differentiation, or indeed ‘social
learning’, the best way to consider such
activity? The precise role of the pre-
SMA is far from clear and it has been
implicated in several different types of
function [14–18].
Converging lines of evidence from
single unit recordings in macaques, as
well as human functional neuroimaging
and lesion studies, has led to the
proposal that the pre-SMA represents
complex condition–action associations
[18]. These contain links between
stimulus and response which can be
described as multiple, conditional or
poorly specified, and of course may
dependuponprevious experiences and
their outcomes — positive or negative.
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and appropriate actions which led to
rewards were learnt by the monkeys.
Both animals had to be clear whose
turn it was because this condition
would determine whether they made
a choice action or not, and both
animals monitored whether the actor’s
response was rewarded. Moreover,
if the reward contingencies switched
such that the actor’s choice was
unrewarded, both animals had to note
this condition because it would mean
the next turn-taker should alter their
response from previous choices. Thus,
it was crucial to distinguish whether it
was the self or other’s turn, and map
which was the appropriate response
in the current trial context.
Yoshida et al. [7] found that a small
number (<5%) of partner neurons
were selective for the target button
colour — the goal of the partner’s
action in the current trial — while
one-third encoded the spatial location
of the goal. Importantly, some 40% of
partner neurons also responded
differently on error trials, compared to
correct ones. Thus, apart from
distinguishing self from other, activity
within this population of neurons also
held a rich set of information about
current trial context.
Viewed from this perspective,
partner neurons might be considered
to be part of the neural system involved
in encoding condition–action
relationships which, in this particular
paradigm, depended upon
differentiating self from other, among
other variables. An interesting question
is whether the same neurons might
encode different condition–action
relationships if a single monkey was
trained on a different protocol that didnot require distinguishing self from
other, or even turn-taking. Are these
neurons part of a general purpose
system that maps and remaps
appropriate actions to different
contexts, regardless of their social
implications? Answering such
a question would require an ambitious
and challenging experimental design,
but would seem to be crucial for
a better theoretical understanding
of the role of the pre-SMA.
Moreover, thesefindingshighlightone
of the challenges for ‘social
neuroscience’. Social behaviour
requires understanding appropriate
responses, conditional upon the current
context, which often also depends upon
previous contexts. Encoding such
condition–action rules might be
important for many aspects of an
animal’s survival and aren’t necessarily
specific to any ‘social’ brain system.
Thus, distinguishing what is truly social
in neural terms and what is built on
underlying circuits that subserve more
general brain functions is not always
easy (see also [11]). In this regard, the
research presented by Yoshida et al. [7]
provides an important and provocative
contribution, though one that raises as
many questions as it answers.References
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Effects of Environmental ChangeEstablishingbiologicalbaselines requiresaccess toorganismswhich livedearlier
in, or before, the present episode of anthropogenic change. Specimens of
a bryozoan collectedonScott’sAntarctic expeditions, andsubsequently, provide
clear evidence of recent increases in growth rate after 80 years of constancy.John A. Raven
Studies of how organisms have
responded to the continuingenvironmental changes that began
some two centuries ago require
access to biological specimens that
provide data from which growth rates(for example) can be estimated. One
such source is organisms that are still
alive, e.g. annual rings of trees with
secondary thickening. Here the
thickness of the rings indicates the
growth rate of the tree, although not
necessarily the environmental factor
altering the growth rate. Similar
principles apply to growth rings in the
shells of long-lived bivalve molluscs.
For organisms with shorter life-spans
relative to the period under
investigation, data are available from
fossils in well-dated sediments,
